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Back to the Future of Originalism 
Josh Blackman* 
INTRODUCTION 
In the blink of the jurisprudential eye, the Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”) went to the brink of unconstitutionality and back. Along that 
rapid journey, lawyers and scholars from across the philosophical spectrum 
who were focused on developing, refining, and advancing constitutional 
arguments at breakneck speeds, were often unable to pause and appreciate 
the monumental importance of what was happening. This essay, as part of a 
symposium issue for the Chapman Law Review, takes a step back, and 
reflects on the legal challenge’s impact on originalism and constitutional 
law.1 
In NFIB v. Sebelius,2 originalists, who for decades have sought to 
restore the original meaning of the Constitution, shied away from that task, 
and advanced a strategy that would excise the individual mandate alone 
without disturbing any New Deal-era precedents. Rather than asserting an 
originalist challenge, the challengers turned to appeals to popular 
constitutionalism and led a concerted effort to create, and then draw 
attention to, the law’s unpopularity and unconstitutionality. This was a 
concerted effort to move the argument from “off-the-wall” to “on-the-
wall.” These two moves—the decision not to assert the originalist case for 
the unconstitutionality of the individual mandate and to appeal to popular 
constitutionalism—have gone largely unrecognized and unappreciated. 
Both of these choices speak to the potential limitations of originalism in a 
world bound by entrenched precedents and the potential strength of 
fostering social movements intent on restoring the “lost Constitution.” 
 
 * Assistant Professor, South Texas College of Law. I would like to thank David Bernstein, Jack 
Balkin, Randy Barnett, Andy Koppelman, Mike Ramsey, John McGinnis, Mike Rappaport, Tim 
Sandefur, Ilya Shapiro, Lawrence Solum, Ilya Somin, Lee Strang, and Rebecca Zietlow for their 
insights into this case, the litigation strategy, and what lessons we should draw. Further, I would like to 
thank participants at the Georgetown University Law Center Advanced Constitutional Law Colloquium, 
South Texas College of Law Faculty Lecture Series, the Western Michigan University Medical 
Humanities Conference, the Mid-Atlantic Law & Society Association Conference, the Federalist 
Society Faculty Conference, and the Loyola Law School Constitutional Law Colloquium for their 
helpful feedback during presentations of this paper. I also benefited greatly from interviews with many 
of the attorneys, think-tankers, government officials, and pundits who guided this case from the 
beginning until the end. 
 1 See also JOSH BLACKMAN, UNPRECEDENTED: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO 
OBAMACARE (forthcoming 2013) (discussing NFIB v. Sebelius). 
 2 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
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Through such social movements, advanced by groups like the Tea 
Party, society witnessed a rededication, however convenient, to the 
Constitution. Although the Affordable Care Act was ultimately upheld, one 
of the greatest takeaways from the case was its contribution towards our 
collective constitutional culture. This challenge has contributed to the 
growing sentiment that the powers of the federal government are in fact 
constrained, and that the New Deal cases may not have definitively 
resolved the scope of federal power. Larry Solum has referred to this shift 
in thinking as our now-unsettled “constitutional gestalt.”3 
What does this unsettled gestalt portend for originalism? In NFIB, the 
challengers made a conscious decision not to advance the originalist 
argument. This choice may have costs. Namely, any immediate gains that 
could have been obtained by striking down the mandate may in the long 
run undermine originalist jurisprudence. This decision may risk harming 
originalism, and open up originalist scholars to criticisms of being “faint-
hearted.” Perhaps NFIB represents a short-term victory for the ends, but a 
long-term loss for the means.4  
Yet, the litigation strategy in NFIB has shown that it is possible to 
advance originalism without using originalism. Even when originalism is 
not at the forefront, this jurisprudence exudes a gravitational pull that tugs 
at the Constitution, and prevents it from drifting too far away its original 
meaning. It is this pull that brought the Rehnquist Court’s “New 
Federalism” back into the orbit of the original understanding, even if cases 
such as Lopez,5 Morrison,6 and Printz7 were not by themselves originalist 
challenges.  
The challenge to the ACA was successful in unsettling our 
constitutional gestalt because it seamlessly blended a theory of 
constitutional law and the social movements that backed the theories. Both 
of these avenues gravitated around the original understanding of the 
Constitution. First, the theories were grounded in the Constitution’s 
structural protections of individual liberty, and second, the movements 
sought to restore what they viewed as the original Constitution. This 
strategy provides a how-to manual for constitutional litigation. Learning 
how to replicate this dual-focused phenomenon of popular originalism may 
be the most enduring lesson for future constitutional challenges.  
 
 3 Lawrence B. Solum, The Legal Effects of NFIB v. Sebelius and The Constitutional Gestalt, 
passim (Georgetown Pub. Law Research Paper No. 12-152, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2152653.  
 4 Such a calculus may have also influenced Chief Justice Roberts’ decision-making process, 
though, he likely feared a short-term gain for federalism, paired with a long-term loss for the Court’s 
institutional credibility. See Jan Crawford, Roberts Switched Views to Uphold Health Care Law, 
CBSNEWS.COM (July 1, 2012 1:29 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-3460_162-57464549/roberts-
switched-views-to-uphold-health-care-law/. 
 5 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 6 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 7 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
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I.  THE ORIGINALIST CONSTITUTION 
This Part explores how the originalist constitution evolved in the 
challenge to the Affordable Care Act. First, I consider the significance of 
the non-originalist challenge to the ACA. Second, I look at how originalists 
were instrumental from moving the challenge to the ACA from “off-the-
wall” to “on-the-wall.” Third, I query what this challenge means for the 
originalist goal of restoring the lost Constitution.8  
A. The Non-Originalist Challenge to the Affordable Care Act 
1.  Originally Originalist 
Unlike earlier conservative or libertarian constitutional arguments, the 
challenge to the ACA did not mobilize around the text and the history of 
the Constitution. While the two-decades-long path to District of Columbia 
v. Heller9 was paved with deep probing into the original understanding of 
the Second Amendment,10 the challenge to the ACA, blazed in record time, 
was grounded purely in terms of whether the mandate could be squared 
with existing precedents of the Court or whether it was unprecedented.11 
Originalism and textualism served only as secondary, backup arguments; 
however, Justices both in the majority and in the dissent made numerous 
originalist arguments.12 The genius of the strategy was to conform the 
 
 8 In this section, I focus quite heavily on the views of Randy Barnett as representative of broader 
originalist and libertarian sentiments. Barnett, whom the New York Times dubbed the “intellectual 
godfather” of the legal challenge of the mandate, was the leading legal voice in this challenge from this 
outset, was responsible for, and should receive credit for many of the key strategic and jurisprudential 
decisions in this case. See Kate Zernike, Proposed Amendment Would Enable States to Repeal Federal 
Law, N.Y. TIMES, (Dec. 19, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/20/us/politics/20states.html?_r=0 
(dubbing Barnett the “intellectual godfather”). Barnett has written a number of noted works, including: 
RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004); 
RANDY E. BARNETT, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES IN CONTEXT (2008); RANDY E. BARNETT, THE 
STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW (1998). 
 9 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 10 See Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 
924, 926 (2009) (discussing the Court’s focus on the idea that the Constitution should be interpreted 
based on its “original meaning”); see also Josh Blackman, Originalism for Dummies, (Dec. 19, 2008), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1318387. 
 11 See, e.g., Precedents cited in health care battle, USA TODAY (Mar. 20, 2012, 9:12 PM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/judicial/story/2012-03-20/ 
precedents-supreme-court/53674608/1 (listing the four cases most likely to be cited by both sides of the 
debate); Randy Barnett, Nathaniel Stewart & Todd F. Gaziano, Why the Personal Mandate to Buy 
Health Insurance Is Unprecedented and Unconstitutional, THE HERITAGE FOUND. (Dec. 9, 2009), 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/12/why-the-personal-mandate-to-buy-health-insurance-
is-unprecedented-and-unconstitutional (arguing that the mandate is unprecedented); David Orentlicher, 
Precedents for Upholding Health Care Law, CNN (March 27, 2012, 8:25 AM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2012/03/27/opinion/orentlicher-health-care/index.html (arguing there is ample precedent to support the 
mandate). 
 12 See, e.g., Michael Ramsey, Originalism in the Health Care Case: What is a Direct Tax?, THE 
ORIGINALISM BLOG (July 8, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://originalismblog.typepad.com/ 
the-originalism-blog/2012/07/originalism-in-the-health-care-case-what-is-a-direct-taxmichael-
ramsey.html (discussing direct taxes); Michael Ramsey, Originalism in the Health Care Decision: The 
Federal Government’s “Problem-Solving Powers,” THE ORIGINALISM BLOG (July 6, 2012, 7:00 AM), 
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argument within the Court’s existing precedents: to strike down the 
mandate would not require overturning a single precedent. Indeed, five 
Justices accepted this position, entirely consistent with the Court’s 
jurisprudence from M’Culloch v. Maryland13 to Wickard v. Filburn14 to 
Gonzales v. Raich.15 However, the originalist dog that did not bark speaks 
volumes about the potency of originalism in significant constitutional 
challenges such as this. 
In late 2009, even before the enactment of the ACA, most prominent 
constitutional theorists who focused on originalist scholarship readily 
conceded that the individual mandate was not consistent with the original 
understanding of the Constitution—namely the Commerce Clause and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.16 On September 18, 2009, six months before 
the law’s enactment, Randy Barnett, in noting that “the Supreme Court has 
certainly not limited either the enumerated commerce power or the implied 
spending power to the original meaning of the text,”17 wondered aloud 
whether the Court could strike down Obamacare based on original 
meaning: “[s]tranger things have happened. After all, without any 
precedent standing in their way, a majority of the Supreme Court decided 
to follow the original meaning of the text of the Second Amendment in 
District of Columbia v. Heller.”18  
Barnett, along with Todd Gaziano and Nathaniel Stewart, authored a 
seminal report for The Heritage Foundation laying out the case against the 
mandate.19 In addition to developing the activity/inactivity distinction—an 
argument entirely consistent with modern Supreme Court precedent—the 
report also asserted that an originalist challenge to the law was a possible 
route. 
[T]he 2008 case of District of Columbia v. Heller shows that a majority of the 
current Court takes the text and original public meaning of the Constitution quite 
 
http://originalismblog.typepad.com/the-originalism-blog/2012/07/originalism-in-the-health-care-
decision-the-federal-governments-problem-solving-powersmichael-ramsey.html (highlighting exchange 
between Justice Ginsburg and the joint dissent).  
 13 M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 359–60 (1819) (holding Congress has the power to 
incorporate a bank even when such is not a power enumerated within the Constitution). 
 14 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 123–24 (1942) (holding that even a wheat farmer’s trivial 
contribution to the market, when combined with the contributions of other similarly situated farmers, 
was subject to federal regulation under the Commerce Clause because the commerce power “extends to 
those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce . . . as to make regulation of them 
appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution of the granted power to 
regulate interstate commerce” (citation omitted)).  
 15 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24 (2005) (holding Congress “had a rational basis for believing 
that failure to regulate the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping 
hole in [Congress’s Application of Controlled Substance Act (CSA)].”). 
 16 Barnett et al., supra note 11. 
 17 Randy Barnett, Healthcare: Is “mandatory insurance” unconstitutional?, POLITICO (Sept. 18, 
2009), http://www.politico.com/arena/perm/Randy_Barnett_8256A4EF-01E6-4207-B4E8-
C761F2FDB5BF.html. 
 18 Id. (italics added). 
 19 Barnett et al., supra note 11. 
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seriously, especially when considering issues not controlled by existing 
precedent. A constitutional challenge to an individual health care mandate would 
be considered an opportunity by the Justices who made up the Heller majority to 
further vindicate their commitment to text and history in evaluating claims of 
federal power.20 
2.  The Move Away from Originalism 
Ultimately the challengers to the Affordable Care Act decided not to 
ground their arguments in originalism, and did not seek the reversal of 
precedents concerning the scope of federal power stretching from Wickard 
v. Filburn21 to Gonzales v. Raich.22 Randy Barnett explained this decision 
in some detail. First, Barnett acknowledged that, based on his 
understanding of the original meaning of the Constitution, the individual 
mandate is clearly unconstitutional.23 In his 2010 article, Commandeering 
the People, Barnett wrote, “[U]nder the original meaning of the Commerce 
Clause, as affirmed by the Court, Congress lacks any power over the health 
insurance business. The insurance business, like the businesses of 
manufacturing or agriculture, is to be regulated exclusively by the states.”24 
Or, more clearly stated in a footnote, “As suggested in Part I, both the 
regulations imposed on insurance companies, and the insurance mandate 
imposed on individuals, most likely exceed the original scope of the 
enumerated powers of Congress.”25  
Second, Barnett concedes that a key non-originalist precedent stands 
in the way of restoring the original understanding of commerce with 
respect to insurance contracts—a matter that should be left for the states. In 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association26—a decidedly 
unoriginalist opinion—Justice Black reversed Paul v. Virginia,27 which had 
held that “[i]ssuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of 
commerce.”28 In September of 2012—three months after NFIB v. 
Sebelius—Barnett made similar points during his address at the Cato 
Institute’s Constitution Day Symposium: “Doctrines certainly constrained 
us in our challenges to the Affordable Care Act. We might like to have 
contested the insurance company regulations as outside the bounds of the 
original meaning of the Commerce Clause but we were definitively 
foreclosed by such an argument by the 1944 case of U.S. v. South-Eastern 
 
 20 Id. 
 21 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 22 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 23 Randy E. Barnett, Commandeering the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate 
is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 581, 586–87 (2010). 
 24 Id. at 585. 
 25 Id. at 624 n.154. 
 26 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944). 
 27 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. 168 (1869), overruled by United States v. South-Eastern 
Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 543–50 (1944). 
 28 Id. at 183. 
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Underwriters.”29 Or, stated more precisely, “Under the original meaning of 
the Constitution, for example, Congress would have no power to regulate 
the health insurance business since insurance contracts—like the practice of 
medicine—are not ‘commerce,’ which is why both activities have 
traditionally been regulated by the states.”30  
Third, without acknowledging that these non-originalist precedents are 
correct, Barnett still contends that under current Supreme Court law, the 
individual mandate is unconstitutional.31 “Existing doctrine reveals the 
individual mandate is unconstitutional even if we assume that Congress has 
the power to regulate the insurance business that the New Deal Supreme 
Court gave it in South-Eastern Underwriters.”32 Rather, solely for the 
purposes of this case, the challengers were willing to forego this originalist 
argument and focus on how the Supreme Court—for better, but mostly for 
worse—has developed the doctrine.33 Barnett wrote quite clearly that he 
has not “rested [his] claim that the individual insurance mandate was 
unconstitutional on the original meaning of the Constitution, and neither 
did the parties to the lawsuit.”34 
“This entire case was pursued under existing post-New Deal 
Commerce Clause and Necessary & Proper Clause doctrine.”35 “[M]y 
claim is that the mandate is unconstitutional in the second sense: based on 
what the Supreme Court has said in its Commerce and Necessary and 
Proper Clause decisions . . . and also in its tax power decisions . . . .”36 
Because the mandate was unprecedented, in that it went beyond anything 
Congress had attempted before or anything the Supreme Court had 
considered, its constitutionality was not settled.  
Importantly, this “second” sense must be distinguished from what 
Barnett has described as the first and third senses of constitutionality. The 
first sense focuses on “what the Constitution says and means,” while the 
third sense asks “whether there are five votes on the Supreme Court to 
uphold or invalidate the action.”37 
 
 29 Randy Barnett, Address at the Cato Institute’s Constitution Day Symposium: The Supreme 
Court: Past and Prologue: A Look at the October 2011 and 2012 Terms, Panel I: Obamacare and 
Enumerated Powers (Sept. 18, 2012), available at http://www.cato.org/ 
events/ccs2012/index.html.  
 30 Id.; see also Josh Blackman, Originalism and Obamacare, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Oct. 11, 
2012), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2012/10/11/originalism-and-obamacare/ (quoting 
Randy Barnett on his opposition to the Affordable Care Act) (transcribing the quoted 
text).  
 31 Barnett, supra note 23. 
 32 Id. at 587. 
 33 Id. at 586. 
 34 Randy Barnett, Elhauge Replies to Hamburger, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 22, 2012, 11:52 
AM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/04/22/elhauge-replies-to-hamburger/. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Barnett, supra note 23, at 586.  
 37 Randy Barnett, In What Sense is the Personal Health Insurance Mandate “Unconstitutional”?, 
VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Apr. 16, 2010, 11:27 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2010/04/16/in-what-sense-
is-the-personal-health-insurance-mandate-unconstitutional/. 
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To argue that the Court should roll back unoriginalist precedents 
would be a nonstarter. As Larry Solum put it, “[y]ou cannot argue to a 
District Court that it should overrule a recent decision of the United States 
Supreme Court—the move is ‘off the wall,’ ‘out of bounds,’ and ‘beyond 
the pale [sic].’”38 There were not enough votes to accomplish this 
position—this is the “third” sense of Barnett’s understanding of 
constitutionality.39 As Justice Brennan was fond of saying, “Five votes can 
do anything around here.”40 In order to advance this argument, the 
challengers had to move the argument from off-the-wall to on-the-wall. 
B. Moving the Argument from Off-The-Wall to On-The-Wall 
How the arguments went from being taken seriously by a small cadre 
of libertarian scholars to garnering five votes on the Supreme Court is a 
fascinating story of constitutional persuasion on related fronts: legal and 
populist. This narrative is well encapsulated in a series of back-and-forths 
between Barnett and Yale Law Professor Jack Balkin (who are in fact 
excellent friends).  
1.  Of Theories and Movements 
To Balkin, Barnett’s strategy was two-fold: on the one hand, Barnett 
was advancing a theory about constitutional law that was largely deemed 
frivolous; yet, at the same time, Barnett was also trying, through his own 
gravitas as a noted constitutional scholar, to convince people that his 
argument is not frivolous.  
Randy Barnett wants you to know that his argument was not frivolous. But he is 
not simply reporting a fact about the world. He is engaged in a performative 
utterance. He is trying to make this statement true by the fact that he, a prominent 
constitutional theorist and litigator, is saying it. And he is trying to get enough 
people to agree with him so that what he says is true will actually become true.41 
There is something of a chicken-and-the-egg dynamic at play in 
Balkin’s view. A constitutional theory only becomes non-frivolous when 
people accept it. But, before people accept a constitutional theory, it must 
be non-frivolous. “If Randy and his allies are successful in changing public 
and professional opinion, then they will move these ideas from off the wall 
to on the wall. They will make arguments that were once considered 
frivolous serious arguments, and possibly even winning arguments.”42 
Barnett was indeed successful about moving the idea from off-the-wall to 
on-the-wall. Although Barnett was not successful in winning the ultimate 
 
 38 Solum, supra note 3, at 16. 
 39 See Barnett, supra note 37. 
 40 H. JEFFERSON POWELL, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSCIENCE: THE MORAL DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL 
DECISION 16 (2008). See generally Orin S. Kerr, A Theory of Law, 16 GREEN BAG 2D 111 (2012). 
 41 Jack Balkin, Randy Barnett Wants Us to Know that His Commerce Clause Argument is not 
Frivolous, BALKINIZATION (July 19, 2010, 1:48 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2010/07/randy-
barnett-wants-us-to-know-that-his.html. 
 42 Id. 
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case, his success in moving the argument onto the wall “would work a 
significant change in existing law”: to Balkin he “changed the practical 
meaning of the Constitution, and changed it a great deal.”43 This change, in 
effect, is the change that Larry Solum has referred to as the “constitutional 
gestalt.”44 
According to Barnett, when Balkin calls his constitutional arguments 
“off-the-wall” and associates them with libertarian attempts to restore an 
originalist vision of constitutional law, Balkin “is trying to marginalize the 
challenge to the individual mandate by connecting the argument about its 
constitutionality to [Barnett’s] and others [sic] ‘off-the-wall’ departures 
from conventional constitutional argument.”45 Implicitly, Barnett concedes 
that popular libertarian constitutional goals are still “off-the-wall,” and are 
not ready to be accepted.  
I can tell you what an ‘off-the-wall’—but in my view constitutionally sound—
challenge to ObamaCare would look like: it would contest whether Congress has 
the power to regulate insurance companies under the Commerce Clause, given 
that the original meaning of ‘commerce’ did not extend to insurance contracts, 
which is why for 100 years the insurance business was regulated state by state.46  
The notion of “off-the-wall” is descriptive of the current acceptance of 
an argument by the Supreme Court, not its soundness or its normative 
appeal. Barnett would maintain that this originalist challenge is accurate, 
but not the argument to make. “Contending that the Court enforce the 
original meaning of the Commerce Clause and refuse Congress the power 
to regulate health insurance would be an accurate reading of the 
Constitution in my view, but it would also be ‘off-the-wall’ at this point.”47 
Thus, while maintaining that “off-the-wall” notions of originalism are still 
sound and normatively appealing, libertarians can still advance a non-
originalist argument that has the potential of moving to on-the-wall.  
Barnett and other libertarians did not make the “off-the-wall” 
originalist argument. “But here is the thing. No one is making this 
argument. Not me, not ‘the large group of conservative and libertarian 
lawyers, politicians, and activists who want [sic] to change the public’s 
mind about the powers of the federal government,’ and certainly not the 
Attorneys General of 21 states.”48 Rather, they look solely “at the law as it 
currently exists and [observe] that the Supreme Court has never upheld the 
use of the commerce power to mandate that everyone engage in economic 
activity.”49 Because all that the Court “has ever done is [to] regulate or 
 
 43 Id. 
 44 Solum, supra note 3, at 3. 
 45 Randy Barnett, Balkin “Flips,” VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 20, 2010, 5:07 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2010/07/20/balkin-flips/. 
 46 Id. 
 47 Id. 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. 
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prohibit those who choose to engage in economic activity. . . . [T]here is no 
existing authority for extending the Commerce Clause this far.”50 
2.  Popular Constitutionalism 
To move this argument “onto the wall,” and to change the 
constitutional gestalt, the challengers employed tools of popular 
constitutionalism. The legal challenge to the Affordable Care Act, although 
short of total success, represents an unexpectedly effective social 
movement. Through a series of influential Op-Eds, speeches, and blog 
posts, conservative and libertarian lawyers and professors advanced a 
simple reason why the ACA is unconstitutional—namely, it is 
unprecedented for Congress to force a person to engage in commerce.51 
Epitomized by the now-infamous image of broccoli, the challengers asked 
whether Congress could compel people to buy that flowery green.52  
The challengers advanced a very simple constitutional idea: a mandate 
forcing people to engage in commerce is unprecedented.53 In a very short 
time, a movement mobilized around this new way of looking at the 
Constitution; from the halls of the Ivory Tower, to the halls of Congress, 
and, ultimately, to the halls of the federal courts—taking this idea from 
“off-the-wall” to “on-the-wall.”54 Almost lost amidst the Court’s opinion in 
NFIB v. Sebelius, which upheld the Affordable Care Act under Congress’s 
taxing power, was the fact that a majority of the Court unexpectedly 
accepted the challenger’s primary argument.55 This way, paved by decades 
of conservative and libertarian scholarship,56 fortified by the New 
Federalism precedents of the Rehnquist Court,57 and advanced by the then-
burgeoning Tea Party, “[a] constitutional gestalt shift [snuck] up on the 
community of constitutional actors.”58  
At first, most constitutional scholars ridiculed the challenge to the 
ACA.59 Balkin and a select few others took it more seriously, very much 
 
 50 Id. 
 51 Blackman, supra note 1. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id.; see generally JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 17–18 (2011) (defining “off-the-
wall”). For my review of Balkin’s book, see Josh Blackman, Originalism at the Right Time?, 90 TEX. L. 
REV. 269 (2012). 
 55 Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012); see also id. at 2649–50 
(Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, JJ., dissenting). Arguably, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and 
Alito did not join Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, but Roberts did by reference agree with the four 
joint-dissenters. Thus, broadly stated, there were five votes for this position. 
 56 Solum, supra note 3, at 22 (“The constitutional challenge to Sebelius began its journey to the 
Supreme Court in an intellectual environment shaped by a constitutional gestalt that structured the field 
of constitutional argument.”). 
 57 Id. at 23 (“The New Federalism cases decided by the Rehnquist Court posed a challenge to the 
constitutional gestalt that read the New Deal Settlement as creating plenary and unlimited national 
legislative power.”). 
 58 Id. at 19. 
 59 Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge Went 
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cognizant of how a social movement could advance after it got “onto the 
wall.” Balkin was uniquely positioned to augur the potential outcome of 
this case, for he “observed . . . that politics and political parties played an 
important role, perhaps the crucial role, in combination with intellectuals 
and social movements.”60 Balkin asserted, “Randy and his allies are trying 
to change people’s minds through op-eds, speeches, protests, and litigation. 
They are trying to move things from ‘off the wall’ to ‘on the wall.’ And 
this is not the first time people have tried to do this.”61 This process of 
constitutional contestation had the effect of causing “a constitutional gestalt 
shift . . . . Arguments may occur in the public sphere, in the legal academy, 
in legislative and executive forums within both state and national political 
institutions—and in the courts of law.”62  
Barnett reflected on the social movement that enabled the challenge to 
NFIB v. Sebelius, noting that “[t]here is for the first time a popular political 
movement on behalf of the written Constitution, especially its power-
constraining clauses. This ‘constitutional conservative’ movement is 
famously associated with the Tea Party, but extends well beyond.”63 If the 
same legal argument had been presented without the groundswell of 
support, it would not have made it before. Rather, this popular 
constitutional support nearly pushed the argument over the broccoli finish 
line. 
Randy Barnett further commented on the nature of the political 
movements behind the challenge, when he addressed the American 
Constitution Society’s 2011 National Convention: 
[I] do want to get back to . . . the politics of [the Affordable Care Act] for a 
minute because I understand you had a very lively panel yesterday on original 
meaning . . . . But I take it that the valence in this room is kind of not all that 
sympathetic with original meaning. Original meaning, as far as I understand it, 
says the meaning of the Constitution must remain the same until it’s properly 
changed . . . but the opposite of [originalism], or the different position of that, is 
that the meaning of the Constitution evolves over time to respond to changing 
conditions and also to respond to political initiatives, or what my friend Jack 
Balkin calls social movements. That is what the alternative to original meaning 
is, which is the evolution of constitutional meaning according to political 
 
Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC (June 2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/ 
archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-
mainstream/258040/. 
 60 Solum, supra note 3, at 22; see also Balkin, supra note 59. For further discussion of 
Balkin’s views on popular constitutionalism, see Josh Blackman, The Affordable Care Act and Popular 
Constitutionalism, 26 Public Affairs Quarterly ___ (forthcoming 2013). 
 61 Balkin, supra note 41. 
 62 Solum, supra note 3, at 19. 
 63 Randy Barnett, The Mirage of Progressive Originalism: A New Legal Theory Attempts—and 
fails—to Unite Leftist Politics with Constitutional Fidelity, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7, 2012), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/ 
SB10000872396390444914904577619763983330558.html (reviewing AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S 
UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION (2012)). 
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movements. Well, look if you guys believe in that, then obviously you may be 
looking at a political movement in the face. 
Political movements sometimes will go in your direction, and political 
movements will sometimes not go in your direction. If political movements don’t 
go in your direction, it is difficult to rush in with that copy of the 
Constitution . . . and say no, no, no, it’s the Constitution . . . that stops you guys 
from doing it. Not if you at the same time think it’s political movements that 
causes [sic] the meaning of the Constitution to change . . . through judicial 
appointments . . . confirmed or not confirmed by a politically representative 
Senate. That is just the way business is done.  
Not only should you not be surprised. You should also not complain. 
Except . . . if that day were ever to come . . . you are simply on the losing end of 
a democratic process, and then we have judicial restraint to fall back on. You 
guys have judicial restraint to fall back on in protecting the outcome of 
this . . . political debate that you may have lost. I just want to suggest that maybe, 
just maybe, the original Constitution might have something to offer you guys if 
and when you are ever on the losing end of a political movement.64 
In other words, what’s good for the goose is now good for the gander. 
This case turned the tables on much more than just our Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence. More recently, Randy Barnett has described the realist 
nature of this reversal more bluntly: 
We also have the realist fact that five Justices embraced the entirety of our 
Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause arguments. Critics like 
Charles Fried can dismiss this as emanating from the leaderless Tea Party . . . but 
it is now embraced by what is called the ‘Rule of Five.’ Even if the Tea Party 
played a role, we have long been told that this is how the living Constitution—by 
which is meant constitutional doctrine—evolves in response to social 
movements. So unless it is a living constitutionalism for me, but not for thee, if 
the outcome of this case was indeed impelled by popular constitutionalism, that 
would make it more, not less legitimate on living constitutionalist grounds.65 
Balkin was more cynical of the nature of this change.66  
All social and political movements that seek to change the Constitution in 
practice do something like this, although the exact strategies and methods may 
differ. Attempting this is part of the process of constitutional change. It is an 
aspect of living constitutionalism. (This is one of the greatest ironies of modern 
conservative originalism—it is a perfect example of how living constitutionalism 
actually works in practice).67 
 
 64 See National Power to Address the Nation’s Problems: The Constitutionality of the Affordable 
Care Act, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION SOCIETY (June 18, 2011), 
http://www.acslaw.org/news/video/national-power-to-address-the-nations-problems-the-
constitutionality-of-the-affordable-ca (beginning at 1:31:30). Please note, the above is the author’s 
rough translation and emphasis has been added. 
 65 Cato Institute Reviews Supreme Court’s Recent Term, C-SPAN (Sept. 18, 2012), http://www.c-
span.org/Events/Cato-Institute-Reviews-Supreme-Courts-Recent-Term/10737434182/ (beginning at 
18:50) (emphasis added).  
 66 Balkin, supra note 41. 
 67 Id. 
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This sentiment is indeed quite ironic, especially in light of how critical 
conservatives have been for decades about the Justices reacting to political 
and social movements instead of focusing solely on the Constitution.  
A. Restoring the Lost Constitution?  
Although Barnett publicly distanced himself from bringing an 
originalist challenge to the Affordable Care Act, detractors and critics—
buoyed by Barnett’s decade-long originalist scholarship trail—assailed 
Barnett, claiming that NFIB was in fact an attempt to restore the Lost 
Constitution, or more pejoratively, to bring back the Constitution in Exile.68 
Professor Jeffrey Rosen, far more cynical of Barnett’s motives than Balkin, 
said, “[l]et’s not pretend that this is just a modest case of applying existing 
precedents,” and asked, largely rhetorically, “[t]he question is: [a]re you 
going to reverse decades of judicial deference in economic matters?”69 In 
response, Barnett insists “[n]othing about existing Supreme Court doctrine 
needs to change for us to prevail in this case.”70 In fact, Barnett argues that 
he and the plaintiffs in Gonzales v. Raich71 did not seek to overturn 
Wickard v. Filburn72 outright, but instead sought to distinguish that 
“wheaty” case.73 “While devoting pages to this argument,” Barnett recalled, 
“in a single sentence we did ask that Wickard be reconsidered ‘if the Court 
were to conclude that Wickard is controlling’ (i.e. if it rejected our 
distinctions), but this is an obligatory request never mentioned in oral 
argument.”74  
In a response to a similar point made by Ian Millhiser at 
ThinkProgress,75 Barnett commented, “[A] decision to invalidate the 
individual insurance mandate would not require the Supreme Court to 
overturn ANY of these precedents you like. If it did, we would not have so 
good a chance to prevail as we do.”76 Barnett asserted that the fact that 
 
 68 Randy Barnett, Academic Reaction to Oral Argument on the ACA Challenge, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (April 30, 2012, 10:55 AM) http://www.volokh.com/2012/04/30/ 
academic-reaction-to-oral-argument-on-the-aca-challenge/. 
 69 Nina Totenberg, Health Care Decision Hinges On A Crucial Clause, NPR (June 11, 2012, 4:34 
AM), http://www.npr.org/2012/06/11/154583824/health-care-decision-hinges-on-a-crucial-clause 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 70 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 71 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 72 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 73 Randy Barnett, Jeff Rosen Responds to Critics, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 29, 2012, 12:01 
PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/05/29/jeff-rosen-responds-to-critics/. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See Ian Millhiser, Architect of Anti-Health Care Lawsuit Admits To His Broader Agenda — No 
National Child Labor Laws, No Minimum Wage, THINKPROGRESS (June 12, 2012, 5:00 PM), 
http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/06/12/498288/randys-fake-
constitution/?fb_comment_id=fbc_10150862594781078_22609833_10150864646626078#f3b8e0dd74 
(discussing Barnett’s alleged views). 
 76 Randy Barnett, Comment to Architect of Anti-Health Care Lawsuit Admits To His Broader 
Agenda—No National Child Labor Laws, No Minimum Wage, THINKPROGRESS (June 13, 2012, 3:08 
PM), http://thinkprogress.org/justice/2012/06/12/498288/randys-fake-constitution/ 
?fb_comment_id=fbc_10150862594781078_22609833_10150864646626078#f3b8e0dd74. 
Do Not Delete 4/13/2013 11:18 PM 
2013] Back to the Future of Originalism 337 
originalists are not making originalist arguments is not important: “That I 
hold other views, such as a commitment to originalism, that [sic] are not 
being put forward in this challenge is irrelevant to the merits of the 
arguments we are making in court (as they were in Raich).”77  
However, Rosen may be somewhat correct, albeit indirectly. The aim 
of the strategy was not to reverse decades of precedents, but rather to jolt a 
rethinking of those precedents going forward. It is not necessary to 
overturn precedents in order to change the law. The underlying victory, I 
think, is what Larry Solum has referred to as the “constitutional gestalt.”78  
II.  THE SHIFTED “CONSTITUTIONAL GESTALT” 
Though the Affordable Care Act survived, in the words of Justice 
Ginsburg, “largely unscathed,”79 the impact of NFIB v. Sebelius extends far 
beyond the constitutionality of the individual mandate. In a path-breaking 
article about the state of constitutional law following NFIB, Professor Larry 
Solum identifies a change in our constitutional landscape—what he calls 
the constitutional gestalt.80 The social movement against the ACA had the 
effect of unsettling many constitutional assumptions that have existed since 
the New Deal, and it created grounds for contestations of the scope of 
federal power.81 This—and not the Chief Justice’s curious vote—may be 
the important contribution for the future of constitutional law and our 
Constitution. Yet, this change in the gestalt, independent of originalism, 
also speaks to the importance of originalism as a tool in these future 
contests. I conclude by speculating about possible end games of libertarian 
constitutional thought. 
A. NFIB’s Unsettling of Our Constitutional Gestalt 
The state of our constitutional law does not merely consist of rules and 
precedents. Professor Larry Solum has written that “[at] the very highest 
level of abstract, our constitutional theories and narratives reflect and 
contain what might be called the constitutional gestalt—a holistic picture 
that organizes the constitutional materials (the text, cases, and practices) 
and the norms of constitutional argument.”82 As Solum observed, “In 
NFIB, five Justices of the Supreme Court endorsed a view of the commerce 
clause [sic] that is inconsistent with the constitutional gestalt associated 
with the New Deal Settlement. A fissure has opened in constitutional 
 
 77 See Barnett, supra note 73 (emphasis added).  
 78 See infra Part V; see also Solum, supra note 3, at 2. 
 79 See Adam Liptak, Justices, By 5–4, Uphold Health Care Law; Roberts in Majority; Victory 
For Obama, N.Y. TIMES, June 29, 2012, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/29/us/supreme-court-lets-health-law-largely-
stand.html?pagewanted=all. 
 80 Solum, supra note 3, at 26. 
 81 See id. at 2. 
 82 See id. at 16 (describing a constitutional gestalt as “an overall picture of the constitutional 
landscape”) (quote from original article, on file with author).  
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politics, creating space for an alternative constitutional gestalt.”83 Now, 
what were once “[u]ndisputed norms” about the scope of federal power can 
now be questioned, and arguments which “once were ‘off the wall’ are now 
seen as ‘on the wall.’”84 The notion of the unsettled gestalt accurately 
captures how our system of law changed after NFIB—even though the 
ACA survived.  
In a July 2010 blog post, two years before the Supreme Court’s 
decision, Jack Balkin honed in on the challenger’s efforts to change our 
constitutional landscape:  
Randy is part of a large group of conservative and libertarian lawyers, politicians, 
and activists who want to change the public’s mind about the powers of the 
federal government. They want the public and the courts to rethink the 
assumptions of the activist state that came with the New Deal. They want to 
restrain the growth of the federal government and push it back, because they 
believe that this is more faithful to the Constitution as they understand it.85  
Solum recognized that “[a] shift in the gestalt can only occur with 
support developments in constitutional politics off and on the Court.”86  
Barnett was correct in refuting Balkin’s claim that the challenge 
directly sought to return to pre-New Deal era precedents. But Balkin’s 
prescient claim was much broader. The challenge, whether successful or 
unsuccessful in killing the ACA, had the much deeper objective of 
affecting how people think about the Constitution, the federal government, 
and individual liberty. Or, as Solum stated it, “[t]he most important indirect 
effect of NFIB is that it enables constitutional contestation over the content 
of the gestalt and the meaning of the New Deal Settlement.”87 
After NFIB v. Sebelius, our society has gone through just such a 
rethinking. Putting aside the issue of whether there was a five-vote block to 
strike down the mandate as a violation of the Commerce Clause,88 or if the 
Chief’s discussion of the Commerce Clause was holding or dictum,89 the 
long-term victory of this case was changing how the Constitution is viewed 
by the people—and this is likely what concerned Balkin far more than the 
 
 83 Id. at 2–3. 
 84 Id. at 20. 
 85 Balkin, supra note 41. 
 86 Solum, supra note 3, at 27. 
 87 Id. at 3 (emphasis added). 
 88 See id. at 3 (“The technical analysis leads to the conclusion that on the Commerce-Clause 
issues, NFIB is unlikely to produce stare decisis effects that are clear and uncontested—one way or the 
other.”). 
 89 Ilya Somin, A Simple Solution to the Holding vs. Dictum Mess, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 
2, 2012, 3:47 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/02/a-simple-solution-to-the-holding-vs-dictum-
mess/; see also Randy Barnett, Quin Hillyer: “John Roberts’ Travesty, Point by Point”, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (July 9, 2012, 2:23 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/09/quin-hillyer-john-roberts-
travesty-point-by-point/; Randy Barnett, Quote of the Week, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 1, 2012, 12:41 
PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/01/quote-of-the-week/. 
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Affordable Care Act’s fate. And with this sea change of thought, a new tide 
has arrived, drawn in by the currents of “constitutional contestation.”90 
The long-term effects of NFIB are uncertain. However, we know that 
“grounds of constitutional contestation will have been changed—the 
dominant constitutional gestalt has become open to challenge through 
formal legal argument in ordinary litigation.”91 Future challenges to the 
scope of federal power will no longer be scoffed at as ridiculous—consider 
the drastic change in reactions to the challenge in 2009 and 2012. Scholars 
will be able to put forth ideas about laws that may be suspect after NFIB.92 
Movements will continue to advance understandings of constitutional 
norms consistent with a federal government of enumerated powers. 
Politicians will incorporate constitutionalist ideals in legislative debates 
over the scope of federal power. And, perhaps most importantly, judges at 
all levels will now have a precedent upon which to act based on these 
cases. 
B. NFIB’s Implications for Originalism 
Barnett’s concession that an originalist challenge to the ACA would 
be “off-the-wall”93 speaks volumes about the limits of originalism when 
unmoored from a popular constitutional backing. When confronted with 
perhaps the largest and most significant constitutional law challenge of a 
generation, rather than advancing an “off-the-wall” argument that is 
consistent with originalism—the predominant jurisprudence of modern-day 
libertarians—the challengers turned to something else, and it was not just 
an argument about the extent of the Court’s precedents. Rather, as Balkin 
acknowledges, the challengers aimed to change public opinion, and bring 
the unprecedented argument into the realm of plausibility.94 Once the 
argument crossed that threshold, it was off to the races—and it only 
partially crossed the finish line when Chief Justice Roberts seized defeat 
from the jaws of victory. 
1.  The Means of Originalism and the Ends of Libertarianism 
NFIB reveals that fidelity to originalism must take a back seat when 
more lofty goals can be obtained—goals that are unobtainable through 
 
 90 See Solum, supra, note 3, at 3. 
 91 Id. at 26. 
 92 See id. at 27 (“NFIB has opened the space for constitutional contestation—and that space is 
already being occupied, in the blogs, at academic conferences, in position papers, water cooler 
discussions, email exchanges, briefs, and judicial opinions. Competing doctrinal arguments, theories, 
and narratives are already in play.”). 
 93 See Barnett, supra note 45. 
 94 See Barry Friedman & Dahlia Lithwick, Justice by the Numbers: When it Comes to Deciding 
the Future of Obamacare, the Supreme Court Should Ignore Public Opinion, SLATE (Apr. 24, 2012, 
2:56 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
jurisprudence/2012/04/the_supreme_court_and_obamacare_the_justices_should_be_careful_not_to_let
_public_opinion_guide_their_decisions_.single.html#pagebreak_anchor_2 (suggesting that the Court 
should ignore public opinion). 
Do Not Delete 4/13/2013 11:18 PM 
340 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 16:2 
originalism. The decision to not advance the originalist argument was 
grounded in the fact that the challengers wanted to win the case. As Solum 
has observed, “[m]any originalists believe that the New Deal cases 
expanded Congress’s Commerce Clause power beyond the limits of 
original meaning . . . . [Although] as a practical matter, it would be 
impracticable and costly to undo New Deal and Great Society or to amend 
the Constitution to authorize these programs.”95  
But, this strategic decision may have costs. The short-term gains for 
freedom (striking down the mandate) may be in tension with undermining 
constitutionalism (a jurisprudence supporting a libertarian Constitution).96 
This constitutionalism is an important protection for freedom in the long 
term. By not advancing these ideas when it counts the most, the 
jurisprudence may be somewhat undermined. By refraining from advancing 
originalist arguments in support of originalist ends, the methodology may 
become divorced from, and in effect dilute the theory. 
Perhaps NFIB represents a short-term victory for the ends, but a long-
term loss for the means. Solum observes that this approach might “mitigate 
the damage done to original meaning by precedent and practice.”97 
However, if limited government can be achieved without primarily 
pursuing originalism (such as the ACA case), a cynic could argue that 
originalism is merely a front for what libertarians seek. In other words, 
when libertarianism becomes unmoored from originalism, the objective 
nature of the libertarian Constitution becomes weaker.98 
By not advancing their signature methodology, libertarians risk 
undermining, and perhaps sacrificing, the normative appeal of originalism 
as an objective school of constitutional thought. Should libertarians simply 
try to achieve the goals of a freer society and limited government without 
concerns for how the arguments are made? Or should libertarians seek to 
achieve limited government through originalism? 
2.  Faint-Hearted Originalism? 
In an article criticizing Justice Scalia’s “faint-hearted” originalism, 
Randy Barnett found objectionable Scalia’s “willing[ness] to avoid 
objectionable outcomes that would result from originalism by invoking the 
precedents established by the dead hand of nonoriginalist Justices.”99 
However, Barnett rejected the premise that “if so lion-hearted a jurist as 
[Scalia] shrinks in practice from the implications of a theory he so 
 
 95 Solum, supra note 3, at 25. 
 96 I credit Ilya Somin for this formulation. See generally Somin, supra note 89. 
 97 Solum, supra note 3, at 25. 
 98 See also Josh Blackman, Originalism at the Right Time?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 269, 282 (2012) 
(“Such a theory unmoors originalism from things that are original by relying on occurrences that 
postdate the enactment of the law.”). 
 99 Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity: A Critique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. 
L. REV. 7, 13 (2006). 
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vociferously defends . . . [then] originalism itself ought to be rejected as 
unworkable and ultimately unwise,” in that “Justice Scalia is simply not an 
originalist.”100 
The challengers to the ACA were afflicted with a related strain of 
faint-heartedness as advocates. Barnett concedes that “[c]onstitutional 
conservatives don’t yearn for a bygone age of Supreme Court rulings.”101 
In other words, they do not seek the wholesale repeal of six decades of 
precedents. It may just be that the end goal of enforcing the entire 
Constitution requires the concession—though not acquiescence—of a 
number of nonoriginalist precedents. This sounds, however, somewhat 
faint-hearted. 
While professing a deeply-held belief in restoring the lost 
Constitution, the challengers were willing to rely on—but not 
acknowledge—nonoriginalist precedents, to achieve what is in effect an 
originalist goal.102 By focusing on this one law, the challengers were able to 
move the constitutional goalposts somewhat, to effect a change on the legal 
landscape, without a wholesale reversal of many twentieth century 
precedents. 
Maybe we can call this approach “incremental originalism”—moving 
the Constitution towards original meaning without even arguing that non-
originalist precedents should be overturned. Solum refers to this concession 
as “‘originalist second best’: given the practical impossibility of the first-
best originalist interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the originalist might 
argue for doctrines that limits departures from original meaning to those 
required by practical necessity.”103 Incremental originalism may be a 
pragmatic theory to reconcile constitutional originalism with faint-hearted 
originalism. 
3.  Advancing Originalism without Originalism 
Perhaps this utilitarian calculus may indeed indirectly benefit 
originalism. By using non-originalist arguments to move the law toward 
originalist ends, the challengers ultimately strengthened our fidelity to the 
original meaning of the Constitution in a roundabout way. By garnering 
five votes to cabin the power of Congress, originalists accomplished just 
this task. In fact, the opinions of Chief Justice Roberts, and those of the 
joint dissenters, were replete with citations to founding-era sources, such as 
the Federalist and the ratification debates—this demonstrates originalism’s 
gravitational pull.104  
 
 100 Id. 
 101 Barnett, supra note 63. 
 102 See Solum, supra note 3. 
 103 Id. at 25. 
 104 I thank Randy Barnett for helping me develop this formulation. See 
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2012/11/18/originalisms-gravitational-pull-towards-original-meaning/. 
This topic will be discussed in Barnett’s Dunwody Lecture at the University of Florida in March 2013. 
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III.  ORIGINALISM’S GRAVITATIONAL PULL 
A. Three Views of Federalism 
In order to understand how a non-originalist argument advances 
originalism, we must first consider the nature of existing precedents. Randy 
Barnett explained that there are three views of federalism (and, I would 
add, relatedly, federalism’s structural protection of individual liberty).105 
First, there is the pre-1937 view, where the Court, unbound by modern 
precedents, can rule in accordance with the original public meaning of the 
Constitution.106 Second, there is the New Deal-era view of federalism, 
wherein Congress has a plenary police power to do whatever it deems 
necessary, and any law that fits within the New Deal’s ambit will be 
upheld.107 Third, there is the “New Federalism” of the Rehnquist and now 
Roberts Court.108  
This third strand can be best characterized as “this far, but no 
farther.”109 In other words, the New Federalism did not repudiate the New 
Deal view of federalism, nor did it effect a return to the pre-1937 view of 
federalism. Rather, it asserted that if the federal government seeks to assert 
a power that goes beyond what had already been upheld, it must justify that 
extension for an unprecedented assertion of power. Even under the New 
Federalism, the Court does not adjudge the constitutionality of the new law 
purely based on originalism, but instead based on what Chief Justice 
Rehnquist referred to as “first principles.”110 It is noteworthy that Justice 
Thomas’s originalist opinion in Lopez was not joined by Justice Scalia 
(same for Morrison).111 This tripartite taxonomy helps to explain why 
originalism has, and has not been, used successfully in recent cases. 
Perhaps the best examples in the first category are District of 
Columbia v. Heller112 and McDonald v. Chicago.113 In these cases, the 
 
See also STEPHEN GUEST, RONALD DWORKIN 89 (3d ed. 2013) (discussing how case precedents exert a 
degree of “gravitational force” of fairness that is considered when deciding later cases). 
 105 Josh Blackman, Recording: Video and Recap: Randy Barnett, Neil Katyal, & Paul Clement on 
Federalist Society Panel on Obamacare #FedSoc2012, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG (Nov. 17, 2012), 
http://joshblackman.com/blog/2012/11/17/video-and-recap-randy-barnett-neil-katyal-paul-clement-on-
federalist-society-panel-on-obamacare-fedsoc2012/; see also Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 
2364 (2011) (holding that “individual liberty secured by federalism is not simply derivative of the rights 
of the States”). 
 106 See Carter v. Carter Coal, 298 U.S. 238 (1936); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). 
 107 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); W. 
Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 108 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995). 
 109 See John Valauri, Baffled by Inactivity: The Individual Mandate and the Commerce Power, 10 
GEO. J.L & PUB. POL’Y 51, 63 (2012) (describing the “thus far method and justification of constitutional 
line drawing”). 
 110 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 552. 
 111 Id. at 584. 
 112 District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 113 McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
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Court was largely writing on a blank slate—precedential open fields, as 
opposed to deep in the thicket.114 The Court was in no way bound by any 
sort of New Deal compromise, as the precedential slate was clear. Thus, the 
Court was free to receive, and did apply originalist arguments. In fact, both 
the majority and dissent in Heller and McDonald advanced originalist 
arguments.115 
For decades, until Lopez and Morrison and other Rehnquist-era 
precedents, the Supreme Court was steadfastly locked in the second zone of 
the New Deal vision of Federalism. To paraphrase Larry Solum, that gestalt 
had crystalized. However, originalism’s gravitational pull would crack that 
chrysalis. 
B. Tugging Originalism, Wobbling Constitution 
With my most sincere apologies to Judge Wilkinson, this cosmic 
constitutional theory116 (quite literally) is instructive. In our solar system, 
eight planets orbit around the Sun. The gravitational pull of our nearest star 
keeps the planets in orbit. But (to grossly oversimplify), gravity pulls both 
ways.117 Our planet exerts a pull, however small, on our star. To the extent 
that the planet exerts a pull on the star, the star will wobble a bit towards 
the planet.118 This principle of physics has enabled astronomers to locate 
planets outside of our solar system (extrasolar planets).119 Astronomers are 
only able to detect extrasolar planets—which are too small to be visible 
even with advanced telescopes—by measuring shifts in the movement of 
stars. If a star “wobbles,” that is a sign that a planet’s gravitational forces is 
pulling on it. 
In our jurisprudential solar system, think of our star as our 
Constitution. Various planets that orbit the star represent different 
constitutional theories. The strength of the theory can be viewed as a 
 
 114 See Josh Blackman, Originalism in Open Fields and In The Thickets, JOSH BLACKMAN’S BLOG 
(Jan. 25, 2013), http://joshblackman.com/blog/2013/01/25/originalism-in-open-fields-and-in-the-
thickets/. 
 115 Josh Blackman, Alan Gura & Ilya Shapiro, The Tell-Tale Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
2010 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 163 (2010); Josh Blackman, Originalism for Dummies 2–17 (Working 
Paper), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1318387. 
 116 J. HARVIE WILKINSON, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE LOSING 
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naap/pos/pos_background2.html (last visited Feb. 3, 2013). 
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function of the gravitational pull the planet places on the star. If a theory 
has some pull on the star, even if the theory is not that close to the star 
itself, it still has some influence. 
The tug of originalism, ever so slight, has been the force that has 
helped to break federalism free from its New Deal-imposed chrysalis. 
Originalist scholarship began to emerge in the 1970s and 1980s that 
showed that the Court had departed from the original understanding of the 
Constitution in the New Deal cases, particularly with respect to federalism 
and structural protections of individual liberty. This scholarship exerted a 
pull on the Court’s jurisprudence, ever so subtle at first, but soon enough 
the law, like a star being attracted to a planet, began to wobble.  
Progressives observed this wobble, worried, and hoped that the 
Constitution would remain in the sole-orbit of the New Deal. Cases like 
New York v. United States,120 United States v. Lopez,121 Printz v. United 
States,122 United States v. Morrison,123 Seminole Tribe v. Florida124 and 
others collectively dubbed part of the “New Federalism,” have proven 
otherwise. 
Importantly, none of these cases were argued in terms of restoring the 
original meaning of the Constitution. The advocates did not need to. It was 
sufficient for the Justices to know that errors were made, those errors 
would not be fixed—in Justice Scalia’s words, they were “water over the 
dam.”125 However, with this understanding, the Court should go no further 
from the Constitution’s original meaning without a sufficient justification 
from the government. In each case, the government failed to meet that 
burden, and the Court would go this far, but no further. 
Consider Gonzales v. Raich,126 where Randy Barnett—one of the most 
prominent originalists—did not advance an originalist argument. He did 
not ask the Court to overturn Wickard (other than in a perfunctory sentence 
in the brief).127 Barnett’s arguments accepted the legitimacy of Wickard, 
but asked the Court to go no further. But Barnett did not need to advance 
an originalist argument in Raich. I think it was not satisfactory to simply 
say that advancing an originalist argument would be a losing argument. 
The constitutional force of originalist scholarship documenting how the 
 
 120 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 121 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 122 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997). 
 123 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 124 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 125 Evan Tsen Lee & Josephine Mason Ellis, The Standing Doctrine’s Dirty Little Secret, 107 NW. 
U.L. REV. 169, 191 (2012). 
 126 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 127 Josh Blackman, Randy Barnett’s Changed Tune on Precedents and Unprecedentedness?, JOSH 
BLACKMAN’S BLOG (MAY 29, 2012), http://joshblackman.com/ 
blog/2012/05/29/randy-barnetts-changed-tune-on-precedents-and-unprecedentedness/. 
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New Deal Court got the Commerce Clause wrong exerted the necessary 
pull on the Court. 
Raich, ultimately, did not turn out in Barnett’s favor as the Justices 
saw that it did not go further than Wickard, so no further justification was 
necessary.128 In other words, while Lopez and Morrison went too far, Raich 
was still in the New Deal settlement’s inner-orbit. Perhaps one of the most 
misunderstood lessons after Raich was whether this case presented a 
repudiation of the New Federalism.129 Viewed in terms of the “this far, but 
no farther” lens, the answer is no. The “New Federalism” did not go up in 
smoke with Raich.130 
C. “New Federalism” and NFIB 
NFIB v. Sebelius continues the movement of the “New Federalism.” 
Though the law ultimately survived, I would caution you not to get too 
hung up on counting the votes (the challengers got fourteen out of the 
necessary fifteen votes in the words of Paul Clement131), which very well 
may have changed. Rather than considering how it was ultimately decided, 
instead we should look at how the case was litigated over the course of two 
years from the district court all the way to the Supreme Court. Was this a 
case where the government was able to easily argue that the ACA was 
covered by the New Deal precedents like Wickard? Well they tried, but 
failed, as most judges, even those that ruled in favor of the government, 
acknowledged that this case was different, in at least one or more 
respects.132 Academics who stated that this was an open-and-shut case soon 
had to change their tune and refine their arguments when its failings were 
highlighted. 
Instead, the government tried to justify why this law was 
constitutional, beyond simply citing Wickard and Raich. They did this by 
focusing on the importance of regulating the costs of the health care 
market, and stressing how Congress had the power to address this national 
problem.133 In other words, the government’s behavior acknowledged that 
this law was going beyond what Congress had done before, and the United 
States was attempting to justify this departure. 
 
 128 Id. 
 129 Indeed, there was a “generational” divide within the Solicitor General’s office as to how to 
treat Raich, and whether it represented a repudiation of Lopez and Morrison. This divide is evident in 
the brief Acting Solicitor General Neal Katyal submitted to the 4th, 6th, and 11th Circuit Courts of 
Appeals, and the briefs Solicitor Donald Verrilli submitted to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals and the 
United States Supreme Court. The former position stressed that Lopez and Morrison were the outer 
bounds of the government’s power, while the latter eschewed those limiting principles. For further 
discussions of the government’s evolving view of the scope of the “New Federalism,” see BLACKMAN, 
supra note 1. 
 130 See CHEECH AND CHONG’S UP IN SMOKE (Paramount Pictures 1978).  
 131 Blackman, supra note 105. 
 132 See generally Nat. Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). 
 133 See id. at 2584–85. 
Do Not Delete 4/13/2013 11:18 PM 
346 Chapman Law Review [Vol. 16:2 
This is the modus operandi for governmental litigation under the New 
Federalism: this far, but no farther, without a sufficient justification. As 
much as the government would hate to admit it, this case was not an open-
and-shut case of simply applying existing precedents. The United States’ 
unwillingness to identify a limiting principle in terms of Lopez, Morrison, 
and Raich is evidence of that fact. The government’s decision not to rely on 
existing precedents was due to a fear that Lopez and Morrison proved “too 
capacious,” and “wouldn’t seem robust enough of a limiting principle 
under these circumstances.” In other words, the Court’s precedents did not 
resolve this matter, and the government assumed the burden of going 
further.134 NFIB fits squarely (roundly?) within the third ring of federalism. 
D. Originalism’s Righting of Our Constitutional Lodestar 
Because we are dealing with the “New Federalism,” where unlike 
Heller or McDonald, it is infeasible to advance originalist arguments in the 
absence of countervailing precedents, in NFIB, originalism was only 
needed to have an indirect effect. It was clear that the ACA was not 
supported under the original understanding of the Commerce Clause. 
Barnett and others conceded this at the outset, but argued not in terms of 
originalism. Rather they argued why this case went further than the New 
Deal precedents (this is really what “unprecedented” means), and how the 
government failed to meet its burden of justification. But, the years of 
originalist scholarship demonstrating how the Commerce Clause was 
originally understood imposed the burden on the government to 
demonstrate this further departure from 1787.  
In other words, the originalist scholarship placed a mild pull on the 
star, and created the sense that perhaps it should not be pulled in the other 
direction. The Chief Justice’s vote was not the only thing wobbling in 
NFIB. 
The potency of originalism cannot be measured simply by assessing 
whether originalist arguments are advanced, and ultimately accepted in any 
given case. Originalism’s strength can be seen as a factor of what view of 
federalism and liberty the Court is laboring under. Originalism lays the 
intellectual groundwork for understanding how a particular law deviates 
from what has come before. Sensing how that theory pulls and tugs on our 
constitutional lodestar provides enough of an indication that an act of 
Congress has gone too far, and there needs to be an adequate justification. 
So, in this sense, with the “New Federalism,” originalism’s 
gravitational pull tugs the Constitution towards original meaning, even if 
originalism is not directly advanced in a case. Originalism is the hidden 
force that causes other things to shift, even if we do not directly see why. 
 
 134 BLACKMAN, supra note 1. 
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This is why “this far and no further” works, even when originalist 
arguments need not be made. 
IV.  POPULAR ORIGINALISM? 
The unsettling of our constitutional gestalt between 2009 and 2012 
may be attributed to two important, and interrelated factors inherent in the 
challenge to the Affordable Care Act: legal theories and the social 
movements supporting them. I do not assert that the popular support for the 
challenge solely determined the constitutionality of the mandate. Nor do I 
claim that the theories of the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses 
were adequate to render the mandate unconstitutional.  
Neither approach was by itself enough. Here, the whole was greater 
than the sum of its parts. The popular constitutionalist movement, along 
with the theoretical arguments were both necessary, but not sufficient 
conditions to advance the challenge. However both fronts, when engaged in 
tandem proved quite potent—particularly because the original 
understanding of the Constitution animated both avenues.  
Originalism’s tug was felt in both aspects of this challenge. The legal 
arguments, though grounded in terms of the Court’s modern 
jurisprudence—acquiescing to many nonoriginalist precedents—gravitated 
towards an originalist understanding of enumerated powers, federalism, 
and individual liberty. Likewise, the social movement opposed to the law, 
embodied most prominently in the Tea Party, was organized loosely around 
an originalist vision of the Constitution and founding of the United 
States.135 In this sense, the two-pronged approach of popular 
constitutionalism and legalism were in the orbit of originalism, even if 
originalism was not at the fore of the challenge. This approach is similar to 
what Rebecca Zietlow has referred to as popular originalism.136 
Indeed, some of the most successful constitutional movements in our 
nation harkened back to our foundational charter. The Abolitionist 
Movement, led prominently by Lysander Spooner, cited the Declaration of 
 
 135 See Jared A. Goldstein, Can Popular Constitutionalism Survive the Tea Party Movement?, 105 
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 288, 298 (2011) (“The Tea Party movement is a surprising hybrid of these 
two positions, a sort of popular originalism, a popular movement that purports to advance originalist 
interpretations.”). 
 136 See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Popular Originalism? The Tea Party Movement and Constitutional 
Theory, 64 FLA. L. REV. 483, 487 (2012) (“Finally, and perhaps most importantly, originalism and 
popular constitutionalism can lead in very different directions when determining the relationship 
between democratic participation and constitutional development. The popular originalism of the Tea 
Party raises the issue of whether it is possible to be faithful to the original meaning of the Constitution 
while engaging in democratic politics. If not, popular originalism could paradoxically lead to a 
reduction of the role of democracy in constitutional interpretation.”); see also Lee Strang, Originalism 
as Popular Constitutionalism?, 87 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 254 (“[T]here is no necessary analytical 
connection or disjunction between” originalism and popular constitutionalism); Jamal Greene, Selling 
Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 672 (2009); see generally Jared A. Goldstein, The Tea Party Movement 
and the Perils of Popular Originalism: Theoretical Possibilities and Practical Differences, 53 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 827 (2011). 
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Independence’s promise of equality, and the Constitution’s omission of any 
reference to slavery to support the legal argument that slavery was 
unconstitutional.137 Susan B. Anthony, leader of the Suffrage Movement, 
broadly read the 14th Amendment to guarantee equality to “all persons.”138  
In many respects, District of Columbia v. Heller could be understood 
as a product of popular originalism.139 The legal theories that supported the 
individual right to keep and bear arms were supported by originalism. 
Likewise, the social movement buttressing firearm ownership—led most 
prominently by the National Rifle Association (NRA)—waxed nostalgic 
for the liberties of the revolutionary-era minutemen (though the NRA tried 
repeatedly to sabotage the case).140 
What made the evolution of NFIB v. Sebelius so unprecedented, at 
least as far as constitutional litigation goes, is the seamless union of the 
theories and the movement at all levels of government and the populace. 
The political and social climate in which this challenge came of age created 
a veritable perfect storm for this popular originalist case. Learning how to 
replicate this dual-focused phenomenon may be the most enduring lesson 
for future constitutional challenges. 
 
 
 137 Helen J. Knowles, Seeing the Light: Lysander Spooner’s Increasingly Popular 
Constitutionalism, available at http://hknowles.typepad.com/files/knowles---ls-and-popular-
constitutionalism---law-and-history-review-final-draft-1.pdf.  
 138 Jose Felipe Anderson, Catch Me If You Can! Resolving the Ethical Tragedies in the Brave New 
World of Jury Selection, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 34, 36 n.159 (2008). 
 139 For a related, but different take on Heller’s popular constitutionalism, see Reva B. Siegel, 
Dead or Alive: Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 192–93 
(2008) (“Heller’s originalism enforces understandings of the Second Amendment that were forged in 
the late twentieth century through popular constitutionalism. It situates originalism’s claim to ground 
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the right to bear arms in the decades after Brown v. Board of Education.”). 
 140 See generally ADAM WINKLER, GUNFIGHT: THE BATTLE OVER THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS IN 
AMERICA (2011); Josh Blackman, Book Reviews: The Supreme Court’s New Battlefield, 90 TEX. L. 
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